

ENCLOSURE

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04 FEB 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Case History on Buildings 213 and 213A

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. A case history on Buildings 213 and 213A is summarized in the following paragraphs.
3. On 19 January 1961, NSCID No. 8 assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for the operation of a National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) as a service of common concern to the intelligence community. The Photographic Intelligence Center, CIA, had outgrown its quarters in the Stewart Building prior to the establishment of NPIC. Laboratory space approaching that necessary for full exploitation of increasingly sophisticated collection systems was not available. A facility was needed to accommodate additional personnel, and more complex and space-consuming equipment, with a growth potential for foreseeable systems to be utilized in future years. Comprehensive studies made it apparent that space was a critical item in the future of NPIC. Detailed historical background is included in Enclosure 1.
4. The systems to be utilized in the expanded facilities required special considerations regarding vibration, dust, humidity, temperature controls, special lighting, air handling systems, as well as stringent security needs. The operation required large areas for photographic processing and developing, mixing of chemicals, housing of computers, accommodating mensuration equipment, experimental laboratory space, and storing vast quantities of reference material.
5. The NPIC personnel planning figure has for several years been in the neighborhood of [redacted]. This consists of [redacted] personnel to be on board during Fiscal Year 1964 and has been included in the Fiscal Year 1964 budget submission, approved by the Bureau of the Budget. The remainder are personnel from the military services expected to be on duty at the Center. (Enclosure 2.)
6. After reviewing a wide variety of plans based on NPIC's requirements and the availability of space in the area, the decision to remodel Building 213 to house NPIC was made. Although initially planned for completion by August 1963, a letter to the Director of Central Intelligence from the Special Assistant

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to the President in October 1961 stressed the need for utmost speed and effort to complete the new NPIC facility. The Agency therefore undertook to complete the construction by 31 December 1962 and to begin operations in the new building immediately thereafter. (Enclosure 3.)

7. Because of the decision to begin construction as early as possible, original estimates were made in October 1961 without benefit of even preliminary plans and specifications. These original estimates were based on the limited information available and represented the best judgment of the Architect-Engineer, the Public Buildings Service and Agency representatives. In November 1961, the Architect-Engineer submitted a preliminary construction cost estimate of [redacted] This did not include certain demolition costs and Architect-Engineer and Public Buildings Service charges. On this basis, a preliminary over-all estimate of [redacted] was arrived at for the complete project. On 15 January 1962, the Contractor was directed to prepare an estimate based on final plans and specifications as they became available. At this point, it became apparent that the mechanical equipment, because of its size and character, should be housed outside of Building 213, and Building 213A was added to the scope of the project. In April 1962 when final plans and specifications were available, the estimate was revised upward to [redacted] The Comptroller's request for approval to spend this amount and to obtain the additional funds through a release from the contingency Reserve was approved on 24 April 1962 by the DDCI and subsequently by the Bureau of the Budget. A complete Budget and Financial Chronology is included in Enclosure 4 and a detailed explanation of the increase in estimated cost of [redacted] is explained in Enclosure 5.

8. The General Services Administration (GSA) has committed [redacted] of the [redacted] made available to them for the project. It is estimated that an additional [redacted] will be required for completion of payments on the basic construction contract, change orders not yet negotiated, completion of payments for GSA supervision and inspection, moving costs and Architect-Engineer fees. The figures are summarized as follows: (See Enclosure 6 for summary of estimated costs.)

Total Funds Authorized
GSA Expenditures or Obligations
Projected Estimates to Completion
Estimated Surplus

9. GSA estimates a total of 432,333 sq. ft. of gross floor space for the two buildings. (Five and one-third floors in Building 213 and all of Building 213A) Approximate cost per sq. ft. will therefore be [redacted] Of the total cost, [redacted] is estimated by GSA as being required for construction to meet

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peculiar requirements of NPIC. (Enclosure 7.) Additionally, [redacted] was a conservative value placed by GSA engineers on the costs of expediting the construction, such as acceleration of various subcontracts, use of more readily available but more costly material, increased costs to suppliers, transportation, additional fees, and overtime. Deducting the [redacted] from the total cost of the renovation leaves [redacted] which would have been incurred for a limited laboratory-general purpose type facility with normal construction time allowed. Such a cost would have averaged approximately [redacted] per sq. ft. (Enclosure 8.)

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10. NPIC established the requirement for a briefing facility with a seating capacity for [redacted] Intelligence community committees such as the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), the Guided Missile and Astronautic Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), and Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC), when assembled with their full staffs and other personnel concerned, routinely required seating in excess of the capacity of the old Stewart Building room. Briefings often have been more than 100 per cent oversubscribed, thereby forcing the Center to provide briefings in triplicate. This requirement was justified in light of the importance of the briefing program to NPIC operations and the projected multi-purpose use of the room by NPIC, CIA, the military services, and the intelligence community. Design of the area included installation of a teleprompter system, revolving and sliding display panels and specially adapted projection equipment to provide for the optimum use of the room.

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11. An analysis of possible savings in construction costs in areas other than those of a technical nature or changes in basic design has been made. The external parts of the buildings, the lobby, cafeteria, the corridors and various administrative areas throughout the buildings are areas for possible savings. A total of \$27,000 can be identified as possible savings by the elimination of planters, paneling, granite canopied sidewalk curbs, granite panels in the fifth floor windows, redwood paneling in the cafeteria, and quarry tile in the patio. Assuming that a number of additional minor substitutions could have been made, GSA officials believe that the maximum material savings would not exceed \$30,000. (Enclosure 9.)

12. All of the furniture purchased for Building 213 is in accordance with Federal Specifications (established government contracts) except that in the library, lobby, and reception area. The furniture in these areas was obtained on open bid and did not cost more than equivalent Federal Specification furniture.

13. Joint GSA-CIA controls were exercised throughout the design and construction. A special Agency Building Project Staff was formed to resolve project design conflicts and problems. GSA assigned a full-time engineer to supervise on-site construction. The Architect-Engineer firm assigned on-site personnel

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to provide close liaison between the Contractor, the Agency, and the A&E firm. A Master Plan for Construction Completion and Occupancy was developed and approved. Cost control was accomplished by auditors and estimators of GSA. (Enclosure 10.)

14. In summary:

a. A requirement for a plant to accommodate approximately [redacted] was carefully developed and approved. Funds for the [redacted] personnel were included in the Fiscal Year 1964 budget submission approved by the Bureau of the Budget.

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b. The final cost is estimated to be [redacted] of which [redacted] is attributable to the unique requirements of NPIC and to the telescoping of the planning and construction so as to complete construction by 31 December 1962 in lieu of August 1963.

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c. The final cost is estimated to be approximately [redacted] per sq. ft. Excluding the [redacted] cited above, the cost per sq. ft. would have been about [redacted]. The analysis of costs involved indicates a favorable comparison with other GSA projects.

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d. Controls and supervision were adequate to insure prudent expenditure of funds consistent with the unusual requirements of NPIC and the necessity to expedite construction, and it appears that the final cost of the building will be approximately [redacted] less than the funds authorized.

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SIGNED

L. E. White
Deputy Director
(Support)

Enclosures:

Nos. 1 - 10

Distribution:

- O & 1 - Addressee w/encl
- 1 - DD/I w/encl
- 1 - D/NPIC w/encl
- 1 - Compt w/encl
- 2 - DD/S -- subj w/encl & chrono w/o encl
- 1 - OL (Official) w/held
- 1 - OL, Stenhouse w/held
- 1 - OL, REYN

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HPIC BACKGROUND

1. By early 1959, after three years of operation, first as a special project, HTAUTOMAT, and later as the Photographic Intelligence Center, an office under the DD/I, it was becoming apparent to senior officials of the Agency, that both the methods and scale of operations of PIC were already inadequate and were to become increasingly more so during the ensuing years.

2. A substantial percentage of each input from the collection systems of that day was being backlogged and time coupled with limited resources permitted only a "skimming" of the materials. Still in the planning stage, were advanced systems, the increased takes from which could only result in an inundation of the activity unless forward planning was undertaken and space provided.

3. At this point, Mr. Bissell, then the CIA officer responsible for collection programs, arranged with Mr. Amory, DD/I, and Mr. Lundahl to have the ITEK Corporation of Boston, Mass., carry out a study of Center operations with a view toward proposing an optimum system for full exploitation of present and projected data. The results of the study which were presented to General Cabell, Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Bissell, Amory, White, Lundahl, and the President's Scientific Advisory Committee in October 1959, called for a national exploitation Center with a vastly expanded personnel base (FI's alone), an integrated exploitation system, and a new building to house this facility.

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4. Many of the recommendations contained in this independent report confirmed and expanded upon the projections and views of the senior personnel of PIC, which was operating informally on a joint basis at that time with personnel from the Army and Navy as well as CIA. The projected input figures being furnished by the collectors, the experience of our own personnel in processing large volumes of photography, and the recommendations of ITEK as to the necessity for a greatly expanded and more sophisticated exploitation activity led the Center to redouble its efforts in the area of forward planning.

5. The first step was to enlist help in the area of analysis and systems design for the eventual automation of as many aspects of the activity as possible. Coupled with this was the need for planning the layout and housing of the activity in new and more acceptable quarters since it was apparent to all concerned that the Stuart Building contained neither sufficient space nor an environment even approaching that necessary for the full exploitation of higher resolution photography. The Center which had already been obtaining

planning advice for the several specialist areas of FIC from such firms as Eastman Kodak, ITEX, and Houston-Fearless contracted with the A&E firm of [redacted] in June 1960, to provide the aforementioned services, plus others, and the first concrete steps toward the necessary relocation of the activity were undertaken.

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6. During this same period, late 1959 through early 1960, discussions were being held with the Office of Logistics and GSA personnel in an effort to locate suitable space. A wide variety of plans were considered, including: building an annex to the new CIA Headquarters building, constructing new quarters in [redacted] renovating a then empty laundry, and finally, acquisition of Building 213. Realizing the impracticalities of getting Congress to appropriate more funds for an annex to Langley and appreciating the size of the activity which would eventually have to be provided for, and since the Government already owned Building 213, it became apparent that this facility was the most logical choice, and negotiations were commenced to acquire it. The Center in collaboration with [redacted] continued through 1960 and the bulk of 1961 with the analysis, concepts planning, and design of the systems and layout of the anticipated National Center. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities in December 1960 reaffirmed the need for a single photographic center of common concern and vindicated the planning efforts being carried forward.

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
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NPIC REQUIREMENTS

1. In January 1961, the die was cast when the President and the National Security Council approved NSC104 #8, charging the Director of Central Intelligence with providing a national photographic interpretation center of common concern. The budget and personnel estimates prepared by the Center in June 1961, requested the necessary and realizable increases required to fulfill the CIA commitment. Specifically, a T/O of [] was requested for Fiscal Year 1962 and an augmentation of [] for Fiscal Year 1963. While the inputs being received and planned for at that time actually called for a greater strength than requested, the practical impossibility of recruiting and, indeed, housing anymore personnel played a major role in arriving at the totals requested. These budget estimates were approved by the DD/I and the Director of Central Intelligence. 50X1 50X1
2. By spring of 1961, the future of the west end of the Navy Yard and specifically Building 213 had been determined by Congress, the Navy, GSA, and for its part, CIA. As systems design and layout plans were developed within the Center and discussed with the Office of Logistics, it was realized that the eventual space required for long term expansion and the peculiar environmental and security requirements necessary for the housing of the National Center dictated the need for NPIC to have essentially sole use of the facility. The earlier personnel estimates of the eventual need for over [] personnel, approximately [] PI's plus support personnel, were holding up in light of the systems planning and input figures being furnished the Center by the collectors and the additional experience the Center was gaining in exploiting the incoming materials. Further, the increasing sophistication of planned inputs reiterated the fact that environmental conditions must be specifically tailored to the activity and be of the highest order, in many instances approaching if not duplicating the so-called "white gloves" laboratory. Vibration, dust, humidity and temperature controls, special electrical lighting and air handling systems, to say nothing of stringent security requirements, all had to be provided if the building was to represent a flexible, well-balanced, long-term investment. To have planned for and requested anything less would have been to deny the facts available to the responsible personnel in the Agency. 50X1 50X1
3. The Center's plans for the occupation of the entire building minus USGS space in the 6th floor and the required security and environmental concepts were approved by the DD/I and the DD/S in the spring of 1961.

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4. The decision having been made to renovate all of Building 213 for NPIC, except for USOE space, an AAF contract was let by OSA with [] in June 1961, with an estimated construction completion date of August 1963. The selection of this firm was an obvious choice in that through their prior work over the 1960-1961 period they had gained an intimate knowledge of the Center's operations and its peculiar facility requirements. Shortly thereafter, following a briefing by NPIC, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee urged the President to request the utmost speed and effort in the completion of Building 213 for NPIC use. Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, addressed a letter to the Agency on 11 October 1961, expressing the President's wishes, and the entire planning and construction cycle was telescoped from a planned 26 month period to 18 months. Had the design layout and detailed planning efforts put forth by NPIC and [] not taken place over the preceding months, it would have been all but impossible to furnish the necessary drawings and specifications to a contractor in order to complete the building in the time allowed by the President and the Director of Central Intelligence. 50X1

5. As final schematics and layouts were developed by [] they were brought to the Center for approval and eventually to Mr. Amery, the then DD/I. The demolition and construction phases of the building are discussed later in this paper. 50X1

6. The personnel requirements of the Center which were initially projected and discussed early in 1959, remain to this day valid estimates, at least so far as NPIC is concerned. Subsequent requests for authorization of a personnel strength of [] persons in Fiscal Year 1963 and [] persons by 1964 were forwarded by NPIC and approved by the DD/I and the Director of Central Intelligence. These requirements coupled with the military input of [] PI's by 1964, plus a small number of military support personnel, plus an Army departmental activity of approximately [] persons, total approximately [] people, the planning figure which has been consistently used. 50X1

7. The ratio of usable square footage to personnel in Building 213 is, of course, much higher than that encountered in the CIA Headquarters building, or any normal office building for that matter. The nature of the operation, requiring such large areas for photographic processing and development, mixing of chemicals, housing of computers, accommodating measurement equipment, providing experimental laboratory space, furnishing adequate drafting, illustration and layout areas, and providing for the vast film holdings and map files, plus having to furnish the personnel working in these areas with some minimum normal office space in which to handle their administrative and normal paper work, invalidates any concept of square foot per person ratios normally assigned in regular Federal office buildings. The percentage of true office space in this building is 50X1

negligible, amounting to only 21 percent of the total. The costliness of readying these many specially designed areas as opposed to normal costs incurred in building a typical office building is necessarily sizeable but inherent in the nature of the operation. This very fact mitigated against locating the Center in any building which did not offer at least a minimum expansion capability of five years and, likewise, made impractical the construction of the building in segments or parts. To have done the latter would only have increased the eventual costs to be incurred and presented the operation with a continuing chain of interruptions with the resultant adverse effect on its production capability. In the case of some major items such as air handling, electrical systems, etc., such a course of construction would have been virtually impossible.

IN/S 61-3503

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IN 61-8046

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

October 11, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: National Photographic Interpretation Center
(Recommendation No. 15 of the October 4, 1961
Report to the President by the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board)

In its report to the President on October 4, 1961, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended that the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board explore the possibility of accelerating the time when the National Photographic Interpretation Center is to become operational in its new quarters at the Naval Weapons Plant. Enclosed herewith for your information is an excerpt on the subject from the Board's report of October 4, 1961.

The President has approved the Board's recommendation and has requested that a report thereon be furnished to this office and to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board by October 23, 1961.

a/

McGeorge Bundy

Enclosure

cc: The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
(Attention: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne)

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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER

In view of recent substantial increases in the volume of significant photographic intelligence data available to the intelligence community and of additional increases expected in such acquisitions, we recommend that the Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board explore the possibility of accelerating the time when the National Photographic Interpretation Center is to become operational (now estimated in April 1963) in its new quarters in the Naval Weapons Plant. Because of space limitations in the quarters presently occupied by the Center, interference with the timely interpretation, analysis and reporting of the increased volume of photographic data is expected. It appears that such interference might be avoided by early occupancy of the more adequate and well-equipped spaces at the Naval Weapons Plant, with a resulting increase in the rate, scope and timeliness of photographic intelligence products to serve national intelligence purposes."

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21 October 1961

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bundy:

We have given the highest priority to the design and construction of the National Photographic Interpretation Center's proposed new quarters at the Naval Weapons Plant.

Final plans and specifications are contingent upon the completion of a highly complex systems engineering study. This study, as well as the construction plans and specifications, are in the hands of a specially qualified engineering firm and no effort is being spared to expedite completion of the project. The original schedule called for completion of construction and occupancy in August, 1963. However, as the President's Board has noted, the schedule has been improved to provide for completion in April, 1963. This was accomplished by planning construction in two phases, in order that basic construction could start in December, 1961, some three months prior to completion of the systems study.

On receipt of your memorandum of 11 October 1961, I directed that other avenues be explored which might lead to further savings in time. We find that by departing from the normal process of submitting completed plans for competitive bidding and entering into a negotiated cost-plus-fixed-fee contract on the basis of preliminary plans, a continuous work program can be started in December, 1961. Barring unforeseen difficulties, the Contract Architect-Engineer estimates that under this program the building can be completed some three to four months earlier than now scheduled. However, as you know, the negotiation of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is contrary to normal Federal practice and a project of this magnitude may well expose the government to criticism from other contractors. There is also the undesirable aspect of not knowing in advance the ultimate cost of the project.

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Notwithstanding these objections, we are proceeding forthwith to develop preliminary plans in order to be in a position to enter into a negotiated contract, if, in the final analysis, this appears to be a feasible and desirable course of action.

This determination will be made in conjunction with the General Services Administration and the Bureau of the Budget at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

/s/

Allen W. Dulles
Chairman

AW/S:RGL:fp (20 Oct. 61)

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- 1 - DD/S Subject w/cpy basic (w/hald)

COMCUB: 21 Oct. 1961
Date

/s/

H. Gates Lloyd
Assistant Deputy Director
(Support)

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ANALYSIS
OF
POSSIBLE SAVINGS
IN
CONSTRUCTION COSTS

1. In an examination of the costs of construction of Buildings 213 and 213A, a question has arisen as to the possible savings that might have been made in these costs. Since changes in the basic design have a large influence on costs and constitute a separate subject, this analysis of possible savings in construction is based on examination of substitute materials that might have been utilized.
2. In any consideration of a substitution of less costly materials for the materials used in construction, the technical areas of the buildings must be omitted, since in general the materials used were dictated by technical requirements. This then leaves the external parts of the buildings, the lobby, the cafeteria, the corridors and various administrative areas throughout the building as areas for possible savings.
3. The information on possible savings was obtained as estimates from GSA officials. Important to these estimates is the policy that minimum GSA standards must be maintained in construction to assure reasonable maintenance costs and upkeep.
4. Related to the foregoing policy was the installation of marble veneer and terrazzo flooring in the heavily travelled areas such as the main lobby. The use of the marble veneer and terrazzo flooring is consistent with GSA standards for a building of the cost and size of 213. However, possibly as much as \$3,000 could have been saved in the lobby by elimination of the planters and substitution of plaster walls in lieu of wood paneling.
5. In connection with the external portions of the buildings, only minimum work was done to secure and clean the building. Securing involved blocking the windows with concrete blocks. Cleaning involved patching and painting the exterior surfaces. However, concrete curb and precast concrete panels could have been used in place of the granite canopied sidewalk curbs and granite panels in the fifth floor windows. It is estimated that such substitution would have saved approximately \$15,000.
6. The only feature in the cafeteria that appears to lend itself to substitution is the redwood paneling. Plaster walls could have been used at an estimated savings of \$1,000.

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7. It was estimated that savings of approximately \$8,000 could have been realized in the sixth floor executive offices by substitution of more common materials for quarry tile in the patio, marble veneer in the reception area, walnut doors, glass partitions, and paneling. GSA does not feel qualified to comment on possible savings in the briefing room, since it is considered that the area is technical in nature.

8. In the remaining administrative areas of the buildings, the materials used were in keeping with GSA standards. These materials included vinyl asbestos floor tile, suspended acoustic ceilings and movable partitions.

9. The foregoing analysis pinpoints \$27,000 in possible savings. Assuming that a number of additional minor substitutions could have been made, GSA officials believe that the maximum material savings would not exceed \$50,000.

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CONTROLS
IN
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
OF
BUILDINGS 213 AND 213A

1. From the initiation of planning to provide a new facility for NPIC, various forms of controls were exercised to assure that required capabilities would be provided in an efficient and economical manner. The following paragraphs cite some of the more significant controls that were exercised.

2. The A&E contract, which was negotiated with [] by GSA in conjunction with Agency personnel, provided continuity of effort through the extension of the earlier [] NPIC planning work.


3. The proposals made by [] were examined in detail by various individuals in NPIC and final approval of the renovation to be accomplished was cleared with the DDI.

4. GSA examined in detail the proposals for design with special consideration given to the growth expected in the future of the Washington Navy Yard. GSA expects most buildings in that area in future years to be remodeled for first class general purpose and office usage. In view of this consideration and NPIC technical requirements, GSA accepted the proposed design with minor modifications being made. GSA engineers stated that the materials used in renovating the buildings were compatible with standards expected of buildings in

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
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the Washington Navy Yard in future years and with reduced maintenance costs.

5. The Office of Logistics appointed as on-site project engineer for the Agency.

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6. A Special Building Project Planning Staff for Building 213 was formed to resolve project design conflicts and problems; to provide and/or obtain answers to questions involving requirements peculiar to the Agency; and to provide the Agency's formal channel for all project needs. This Staff did not, in any way, intrude in construction activity being directed by the Public Buildings Service (PBS). It resolved problems that were peculiar to Agency requirements which the PBS has neither the responsibility nor capability to resolve. Membership on the committee is composed of:



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7. GSA assigned a full time engineer to supervise on-site construction. His staff varied in strength at times, but at peak, strength totaled seven engineers, two clerks and three accountants.

8. The Architectural Engineering firm assigned personnel at the project site for immediate resolution of construction design problems and to provide close liaison between the contractor, the Agency, and the A&E firm. These personnel were in addition to those serving under the direction of GSA construction supervisors.

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9. "A Master Plan for Construction Completion and Occupancy Building No. 213", was developed by the Office of Logistics. The objective of this plan was to identify planning requirements and actions essential to achievement of a going NPIC production capability in Building 213 by 31 December 1962, and to assign responsibilities for their accomplishment. This plan was approved by the DD/S and had the concurrences of the Executive Director, the Director of NPIC, the Director of Communications and Security, and the Chief, Medical Staff.

10. GSA exercised authority to cut off further changes in design that would not effect operational capability.

11. Quality control was exercised by GSA in review of the design, during actual construction and in acceptance of the buildings. GSA engineers stated that there was no construction which differed from normal GSA construction, except that required by the technical systems to be operated in the facility.

12. Close cost control was accomplished by auditors and estimators of GSA on all expenditures to include all change orders initiated.